Intelligence Gathering in the Exclusive Economic Zone by Papastavridis, Efthymios
  
 
Published by the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law 
ISSN 2375-2831 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intelligence Gathering in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
 
 
 
Efthymios Papastavridis 
 
 
 
 
93 INT’L L. STUD. 446 (2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
Volume 93 2017 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2017 
446 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intelligence Gathering in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
 
 
Efthymios Papastavridis 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction ................................................................................................ 447 
II. Intelligence Gathering in International Law .......................................... 449 
III. The Legal Nature of the EEZ .................................................................. 453 
IV. Intelligence Gathering by Coastal States ................................................. 461 
A. Maritime Identification Zones ............................................................ 461 
B. Earth Observation Systems ................................................................. 466 
V. Intelligence Gathering by Other States in the EEZ .............................. 470 
VI. Conclusion................................................................................................... 475 
 
  
                                                                                                                      
 Postdoctoral Research Assistant in International Law of the Sea, Faculty of Law, 
Oxford University; Oxford Martin Fellow, Oxford University. This paper arose from the 
Maritime Intelligence Law and Law of the Sea Workshop held in Washington, DC in Octo-
ber 2016, co-sponsored by the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, U.S. 
Naval War College and the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School 
of Law. I am grateful to the workshop participants for the opportunity to exchange ideas 
and to the co-sponsors for the opportunity to participate. The research leading to this article 
received funding from the Oxford Martin Programme for Sustainable Oceans, Oxford Mar-
tin School, Oxford University. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of the 
U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College. 
 
 
 
Intelligence Gathering in the EEZ Vol. 93 
447 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
  ne of the most controversial questions arising from the adoption of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea1 is whether the coastal 
State can control the gathering of intelligence by other States within its ex-
clusive economic zone (EEZ). Many scholars have attempted to answer this 
question.2 Currently, the majority position is that “such intelligence-gather-
ing activities by foreign States in the coastal State’s EEZ are exercises of the 
freedom of navigation and are not subject to [the] coastal State’s jurisdic-
tion.”3 However, in the absence of an authoritative judicial ruling on the 
matter, and with numerous States, including China,4 fervently challenging 
this position, this issue remains very much contested. 
Equally important is the question of whether a coastal State may interfere 
with the navigational and overflight rights of other States in the EEZ in the 
course of intelligence gathering for maritime security purposes. As Klein ob-
serves, “a critical element to protecting maritime security is ensuring that 
states have the necessary information at their disposal to take preventative 
or responsive action.”5 Threats to maritime security include a host of activi-
ties pertaining not only to national security, but, increasingly, also to trans-
national organized crime at sea.6 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that 
                                                                                                                      
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter LOSC]. 
2. See, e.g., Mark J. Valencia, Introduction: Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the 
Exclusive Economic Zones: Consensus and Disagreement II, 29 MARINE POLICY 97 (2005); Mori-
taka Hayashi, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of Key Terms, 29 
MARINE POLICY 123 (2005); Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation, Surveillance and Security: Legal 
Issues Surrounding the Collection of Intelligence from beyond the Littoral, 24 AUSTRALIAN YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2005); Jon M. Van Dyke, Military Ships and Planes Operating in 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Another Country, 28 MARINE POLICY 29 (2004); Desmond Ball, 
Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs: The Implications of New Technology, 32 MARINE POLICY 
67 (2008). 
3. Douglas Guilfoyle, Maritime Security, in LAW OF THE SEA: UNCLOS AS A LIVING 
TREATY 329, 356 (Jill Barrett & Richard Barnes eds., 2016). 
4. See Ren Xiaofeng & Cheng Xizhong, A Chinese Perspective, 29 MARINE POLICY 139, 
142 (2005); see also Zhang Haiwen, Is it Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime He-
gemony of the United States?—Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo’s Article on Military Activities in the 
EEZ, 9 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, 44–45 (2010). 
5. NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 211 (2011). 
6. See generally UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, COMBATING TRANS-
NATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AT SEA: ISSUE PAPER (2013), http://www.unodc.org/doc-
uments/organized-crime/GPTOC/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_at_Sea.pdf. 
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the UN Secretary-General in his 2008 Report on Oceans and the Law of the 
Sea identified seven specific “threats to maritime security,” all of which may 
involve criminal organizations.7 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the need for intelligence gathering 
beyond the littoral ranks high in the maritime security policy of many coastal 
States.8 For example, one of the main U.S. policy initiatives in relation to 
intelligence gathering since 9/11 has been the creation of a maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) system, which seeks to generate and use information con-
cerning vessels, crews and cargos.9 According to the U.S. National Plan to 
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, “MDA is the effective understanding 
of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the se-
curity, safety, economy, or environment of the US.”10 To this end, the United 
States indicates MDA should include the institution of worldwide standards 
for broadcasts of vessel position and identification and automated tools to 
discern patterns of suspicious behavior and potential security threats.11 
Other States and regional organizations have developed their own strat-
egies in handling information on maritime security. Australia and New Zea-
                                                                                                                      
7. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶¶ 54, 63, 72, 82, 89, 98, 107–
08, U.N. Doc. A/63/63 (Mar. 10, 2008). These seven threats are 1) piracy and armed rob-
bery against ships; 2) terrorist acts against shipping, offshore installations and other mari-
time interests; 3) illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction; 4) illicit traf-
ficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; 5) smuggling and trafficking of per-
sons by sea; 6) IUU (illegal unreported and unregulated) fishing; and 7) intentional and un-
lawful damage to the marine environment. 
8. See Natalie Klein, Intelligence Gathering and Information Sharing for Maritime Security Pur-
poses under International Law, in MARITIME SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 224, 224 (Natalie Klein, Joanna Mos-
sop & Donald R. Rothwell eds., 2010) [hereinafter MARITIME SECURITY]; Petros Liacouras, 
Intelligence Gathering on the High Seas, in UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND THE NEW CHALLENGES 
TO THE LAW OF THE SEA 123, 123 (Anastasia Strati, Maria Gavouneli & Nikolaos Skourtos 
eds., 2006). 
9. On the concept of MDA, see Dana A. Goward, Maritime Domain Awareness: The Key 
to Maritime Security, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 513 (Myron H. 
Nordquist, Rudiger Wolfrum, John Norton Moore & Ronan Long eds., 2008). 
10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE 
MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS: FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECU-
RITY, at ii (2005), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf. 
11. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NAVY MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS 
CONCEPT 2007 10 (2007), www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/Navy_Maritime_Domain_Aware-
ness_Concept_FINAL_2007.pdf. 
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land, in light of the large expanses of their EEZs and search and rescue re-
gions, have adopted similar MDA policies.12 Further, on December 14, 2004, 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard promulgated the Maritime Identifi-
cation Zone (MIZ) as part of Australia’s effort to strengthen its offshore 
maritime security.13 The creation of this zone, which extended one thousand 
nautical miles from Australia’s coastline, was to enable Australian authorities 
to identify vessels, including their crew, cargo and journey, seeking to enter 
Australian ports. The air defense identification zones, maintained by the 
United States and other nations, serves a similar purpose. In the U.S. exam-
ple, this zone can extend three hundred miles out to sea in some places and 
requires both civilian and military aircraft to identify themselves and to fol-
low the directions of U.S. authorities.14 
The purpose of this article is not to address all the legal issues arising 
from intelligence gathering in the EEZ, which involves serious questions not 
only of international law, including the law of the sea and international hu-
man rights law, but also domestic law, including constitutional law and crim-
inal law. Rather, this article examines whether the law of the sea permits such 
intelligence gathering, and if so, to what extent. Part II provides a short prel-
ude on intelligence gathering, before the article shifts to the pivotal question 
of the nature of the EEZ under international law. Part III identifies and ex-
plores the rules applicable to the collection of intelligence on the part of the 
coastal State within its EEZ, while Part IV addresses the converse question 
of whether other States are permitted to collect intelligence within foreign 
EEZs. Part V concludes. 
 
II. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
As Jonathan Colby wrote in 1974, 
 
There are no limits to the types and sources of information which may be 
useful. The processing of intelligence refers to the treatment accorded the 
raw data which has been collected. It generally includes appraisal of the 
relevance of the information, as well as editing and cataloguing in forms 
                                                                                                                      
12. See, e.g., Donald R. Rothwell & Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, 
in MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 8, at 22. 
13. See Natalie Klein, Legal Implications of Australia’s Maritime Identification System, 55 IN-
TERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 337 (2006). 
14. See Mark Valencia, Summary of the Bali Dialogue, 28 MARINE POLICY 7, 8 (2004). 
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useful to decision-makers. These tasks vary enormously in complexity, de-
pending in large measure on the amount and quality of data requested and 
actually collected.15 
 
The task of intelligence gathering is particularly challenging in the marine 
environment, not only due to the vastness of the oceans, but also because of 
the diverse legal nature of the maritime zones. As for the methods employed, 
they vary, inevitably following relevant technological advancements. In an 
earlier era, Roach and Smith noted, “[m]ilitary surveys can include oceano-
graphic, marine geological, geophysical, chemical, biological and acoustic 
data. Equipment used can include fathometers, swath bottom mappers, side 
scan sonars, bottom grab and coring systems, current meters and profilers.”16 
Today, they may involve surface vessels and submarines, as well as remotely 
operated vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), seabed landers 
and even satellites and other earth observation systems, such as radars. 
With respect to the legal regime governing intelligence gathering, Natalie 
Klein rightly posits, “Laws relating to the collection and dissemination of 
information as a matter of international law come from a range of sources 
and this remains true in the law of the sea more specifically.”17 Indeed, as 
Dieter Fleck has written, “intelligence activities as such may not be wrongful 
under present international law, but the wrongfulness may derive from ad-
ditional conditions, such as illegal intervention, breach of foreign sover-
eignty, or common crimes committed in the course of espionage acts.”18 
Under the law of the sea, intelligence gathering may violate coastal State 
rights over the territorial sea, since it is presumed to be non-innocent passage 
as set forth in Article 19(2)(c).19 However, intelligence gathering within the 
                                                                                                                      
15. Jonathan E. Colby, The Developing International Law on Gathering and Sharing Security 
Intelligence, 1 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 49, 53 (1974). 
16. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, IDENTIFICATION OF EXCESSIVE MARI-
TIME CLAIMS 248 (1994); see also J. Ashley Roach & Robert W. Smith, Identification of Excessive 
Maritime Claims, 66 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 11, 11–19 (1994). 
17. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 211. 
18. Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence Gathering, 28 MICHIGAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 687, 707 (2007). 
19. LOSC, supra note 1, art 19(2)(c) 
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in . . . any act aimed at collecting 
information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State. 
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EEZ may qualify as a legal activity under the freedom of the high seas pre-
served in Article 87.20 The lawfulness of the act will depend on the nature of 
the intelligence gathering itself and the context in which it takes place. When 
it comes to where States are permitted to engage in intelligence gathering, 
the most controversial maritime zone is the EEZ, as demonstrated by the 
considerable legal literature addressing this topic. Further, many of the inter-
national incidents concerning intelligence gathering, such as those involving 
the USNS Impeccable21 and a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft,22 occurred in the EEZ.23 
It is true that some intelligence gathering activities bear a close resem-
blance to marine scientific research (MSR), which is largely regulated by the 
Law of the Sea Convention, even though it does not define MSR. As Sam 
Bateman notes,  
 
There is a tendency in practice to use the term “marine scientific research” 
loosely when referring to all kinds of data collection (research) conducted 
at sea. However, not all data collection conducted at sea necessarily comes 
within the scope of the marine scientific research regime established by 
Part XIII of UNCLOS.24 
 
                                                                                                                      
20. Id., art. 87. 
21. Chinese vessels interdicted the Impeccable, an unarmed U.S. Navy ocean surveillance 
ship that was collecting data in China’s EEZ on March 8, 2009. See Ann Scott Tyson, China 
Draws U.S. Protest over Shadowing of Ships, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 10, 2009, at A8. 
22. In April 2001, two Chinese fighter jets intercepted a U.S. Navy EP-3 propeller-
driven aircraft during a reconnaissance mission over the South China Sea. One of the Chi-
nese aircraft collided with the EP-3. The Chinese jet and pilot were lost at sea, and the U.S. 
aircraft made an emergency landing on Hainan Island. Chinese forces detained the U.S. crew 
for more than one week and stripped the aircraft of its advanced electronic equipment. See 
Erik Eckholm, Collision with China: The Overview; U.S. Says Spy Crew Wiped Out Secrets in Frantic 
Landing, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001, at Al; see also Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Prac-
tice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 626, 630 (2001) (discussing the aerial incident occurring off the Chinese coast). 
23. For a survey of such incidents, see James Kraska, Putting Your Head in the Tiger’s 
Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial Waters, 54 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 164, 182–84 (2015); see also JAMES KRASKA, MARITIME POWER AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA: EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS 252–53 (2011). 
24. Sam Bateman, Hydrographic Surveying in the EEZ: Differences and Overlaps with Marine 
Scientific Research, 29 MARINE POLICY 163, 164 (2005). 
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Bateman persuasively argues that a distinction should be made between ma-
rine scientific research and hydrographic survey25 and military survey activi-
ties.26 Major maritime powers, such as the United States27 and Australia,28 
adhere to this distinction, while the United Kingdom astutely posits that 
“[w]hile the means of data collection used in MDG [military data gathering] 
may sometimes be the same as that used in Marine Scientific Research 
(MSR), information from such activities, regardless of the security classifica-
tion, is intended primarily for military use and is not released to the scientific 
community.”29 Without further dwelling upon this controversial issue, this 
position, that the distinction between MSR and MDG lies in the application 
of the data, and not in the process of the data gathering itself, appears to be 
on a firm legal ground. Moreover, this position aligns with the overall tenor 
of the Convention not to include military matters within its regulatory scope. 
Considering the discussion above, the analysis in this article proceeds 
without equating intelligence gathering with MSR when the data collected is 
non-releasable and is for the exclusive use of military forces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
25. The Hydrographic Dictionary defines a hydrographic survey as 
[a] survey having for its principal purpose the determination of data relating to bodies of 
water. A hydrographic survey may consist of the determination of one or several of the 
following classes of data: depth of water, configuration and nature of the bottom; directions 
and force of currents; heights and times of tides and water stages; and location of topo-
graphic features and fixed objects for survey and navigation purposes. 
INTERNATIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC ORGANIZATION, HYDROGRAPHIC DICTIONARY 237 
(5th ed. 1994). 
26. Bateman, supra note 24, at 165. For a discussion explaining the distinction between 
marine scientific research and hydrographic survey, see ALFRED SOONS, MARINE SCIEN-
TIFIC RESEARCH AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 110 (1982). 
27. See ROACH & SMITH supra note 16, at 248–49. 
28. Australia established Foreign Research Vessel Guidelines as part of its implemen-
tation of Part XIII of the Law of the Sea Convention, but these guidelines do not reference 
hydrographic surveying or other types of surveys. See Montserrat Gorina-Ysern & Martin 
Tsamenyi, Defence Aspects of Marine Scientific Research, 96 MARITIME STUDIES 13, 20 (1997). 
29. Bateman, supra note 24, at 173. 
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III. THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE EEZ 
 
Intelligence gathering is particularly challenging in the EEZ due to the hybrid 
or sui generis character of the zone,30 which requires balancing freedoms of 
the high seas, including freedom of navigation, and the sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction of the coastal State.31 The relevant Law of the Sea Convention 
provisions determine the legal nature of the EEZ. Article 56 defines the 
EEZ as an area located beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea that cannot 
extend beyond two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the territorial sea is measured.32 Article 55 specifies that the EEZ is subject 
to a “special legal regime” established in Part V of the Convention, which 
governs the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and 
freedoms of other States in the EEZ.33 Thus, the rules governing the EEZ 
no longer allow the use of the traditional principles of sovereignty and free-
dom of the high seas in identifying the coastal State’s sovereign sphere and 
the freedoms of other States.34 As one commentator notes: 
 
[I]n terms of territory, the EEZ is a no man’s land (and thus high seas), 
whereas in terms of function (i.e., usage and protection rights) the EEZ is 
a sui generis zone subject to a ‘specific legal regime’ (Article 55 of LOSC), 
located quasi ‘between’ the maritime territory of a coastal state and the high 
seas.35 
 
In essence, the coastal State does not enjoy territorial sovereignty, but 
only sovereign rights over economic resources within the EEZ. Under Arti-
cle 56, these sovereign rights concern the conservation, management, and 
                                                                                                                      
30. As far as can be determined, the term “sui generis zone” was first used by the Chair-
man of the Second Committee during the UNCLOS III negotiations. See 5 OFFICIAL REC-
ORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 153 (2008). 
Leading textbooks have adopted this terminology. See, e.g., R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 166 (3d ed. 1999). 
31. See generally DAVID JOSEPH ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1987); BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC 
ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA (1989). 
32. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 56. 
33. Id., art. 55. 
34. See Umberto Leanza & Maria Cristina Caracciolo, Exclusive Economic Zone, in 1 THE 
IMLI MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW: THE LAW OF THE SEA 178, 185 (Mal-
gosia Fitzmaurice & Norman A. Martínez Gutiérrez eds., 2014). 
35. Alexander Proelss, The Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone in Perspective: Legal Status 
and Resolution of User Conflicts Revisited, 26 OCEAN YEARBOOK 87, 89 (2012). 
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exploitation of natural resources, both biological and non-biological, and 
other activities aimed at the exploration and exploitation of the area for eco-
nomic purposes, such as the production of energy from water, currents and 
winds.36 Still, under Article 58, other States enjoy “the freedoms referred to 
in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine ca-
bles and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to 
these freedoms . . . compatible with the other provisions of this Conven-
tion.”37 This list is exhaustive, even if the reference to other lawful uses 
makes it somewhat flexible.38 According to the Virginia Commentary, “[t]he 
‘other internationally lawful uses’ include, inter alia, ‘those associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines.’ This does 
not include fishing, which is governed by Articles 61 to 73.”39 
However, as underscored above, these freedoms are subject to the “spe-
cial legal regime” of the EEZ and should not be taken as freedoms of the 
high seas per se. Equally, the coastal States’ sovereign rights are not absolute, 
but qualified by specific provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, as 
well as by the general requirements of the principle of good faith and the 
prohibition of abuse of right.40 Indeed, Articles 56 and 58 impose mutual 
obligations on the coastal State to take into account the rights and duties of 
other States and on other States to take due regard of the rights and duties 
of the coastal State.41 This due regard requirement is key to the harmonious 
reading and application of the Convention and is pivotal to our inquiry. 
The Law of the Sea Convention also provides the so-called “residual 
rule,” which applies to cases where the Convention confers no rights on ei-
ther the coastal State or other States. According to Article 59,  
 
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to 
the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and 
a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other 
State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and 
                                                                                                                      
36. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 56. 
37. Id., art. 58. 
38. Leanza & Caracciolo, supra note 34, at 193. 
39. See 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMEN-
TARY 564 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1993) [hereinafter 2 VIRGINIA COM-
MENTARY]. 
40. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 300 (“States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms rec-
ognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.”). 
41 Id., arts. 56, 58. 
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in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the re-
spective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the 
international community as a whole.  
 
The residual rule balances the coastal State’s position and the position of 
other States in situations where the activity in question is neither an exercise 
of a sovereign right of the coastal State, nor an exercise of a freedom of 
communication of the other State. However, as noted in the most recent 
Law of the Sea Commentary, “Art[icle] 59 does not provide precise answers, 
but rather requires that conflicts ought to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on the individual circumstances and based on a balancing of the 
interests involved, with the aim to achieve an equitable solution.”42 Indeed, 
it is a very context-specific provision, which should not be taken as a panacea 
to any conflict that may arise. Further, it is important to note that many dis-
putes concerning the uses of the EEZ could be resolved by the proper ap-
plication of the due regard principle enshrined in Articles 56(2) and 58(3).43 
Two recent judgments of international tribunals demonstrate how the 
application of the due regard principle can resolve such disputes. The first 
was the arbitration between Mauritius and the United Kingdom in which 
Mauritius claimed that the establishment of a marine protected area (MPA) 
in the Chagos Archipelago extinguished its traditional fishing rights in the 
territorial sea and the EEZ surrounding the archipelago.44 The arbitral tribu-
nal upheld Mauritius’ claim that the United Kingdom had violated Article 
56(2), finding that Mauritius is entitled to fishing rights in the territorial sea 
and the EEZ pursuant to the United Kingdom’s unilateral actions.45 
                                                                                                                      
42. See THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMEN-
TARY 459 (Alexander Proelss ed., 2017). 
43. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 56(2) (“In exercising its rights and performing its duties 
under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard 
to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provi-
sions of this Convention.”) (emphasis added); id., art. 58(3) 
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and 
shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are 
not incompatible with this Part. 
(emphasis added). 
44. See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. U.K.), Case No. 2011-
03, Award, ¶ 414 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/MU-UK% 
2020150318%20Award.pdf. 
45. These unilateral actions are known as the Lancaster House Undertakings (1965). 
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In scrutinizing Article 56(2), the tribunal reasoned as follows:  
 
[T]he ordinary meaning of “due regard” calls for the United Kingdom [the 
coastal State] to have such regard for the rights of Mauritius [the other 
State] as is called for by the circumstances and by the nature of those rights. The Tri-
bunal declines to find in this formulation any universal rule of conduct. 
The Convention does not impose a uniform obligation to avoid any im-
pairment of Mauritius’ rights; nor does it uniformly permit the United 
Kingdom to proceed as it wishes, merely noting such rights. Rather, the 
extent of the regard required by the Convention will depend upon the na-
ture of the rights held by Mauritius, their importance, the extent of the anticipated im-
pairment, the nature and importance of the activities contemplated by the United King-
dom, and the availability of alternative approaches. In the majority of cases, this 
assessment will necessarily involve at least some consultation with the 
rights-holding State.46 
 
Here, the tribunal held that the approach of the United Kingdom to consul-
tations with other States provided a practical example of due regard and a 
yardstick against which the communications with Mauritius can be meas-
ured. For example, it found that “the United States was consulted in a timely 
manner and provided with information, and that the United Kingdom was 
internally concerned with balancing the MPA with U.S. rights and inter-
ests.”47 Such consultations never took place between the United Kingdom 
and Mauritius, which, among other reasons, substantiated a violation of Ar-
ticle 56(2) by the United Kingdom.48 
This ruling is reminiscent of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Fish-
eries Jurisdiction judgment in 1974.49 In examining the nature of preferential 
fishing rights of the coastal State, the ICJ stated, “[i]t is implicit in the con-
cept of preferential rights that negotiations are required in order to define or 
delimit the extent of those rights . . . .”50 According to the Court, the duty to 
negotiate in good faith meant that it would be the task of the States con-
cerned to act with reasonable regard. Thus, the Court found that: 
 
                                                                                                                      
46. Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, supra note 44, ¶ 519 (emphasis added). 
47. Id., ¶ 528. 
48. Id., ¶ 536. 
49. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (July 25). 
50. Id., ¶ 74. 
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to conduct their negotiations on the basis that each must in good faith pay 
reasonable regard to the legal rights of the other in the waters around Ice-
land outside the 12-mile limit, thus bringing about an equitable apportionment 
of the fishing resources based on the facts of the particular situation and 
having regard to the interests of other states which have established fishing 
rights in the area.51 
 
The second recent judgment is the extensively discussed award of the 
tribunal in the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines and China.52 
Here, the Philippines claimed that China interfered with its fishing rights in 
violation of Article 58(3).53 The tribunal agreed with the interpretation of due 
regard found in the Chagos Marine Protected Area arbitration, as well as the 
finding of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its Fisheries 
advisory opinion.54 The latter interpreted due regard by reading it in conjunc-
tion with the obligations directly imposed upon nationals by Article 62(4), 
which extends a duty on the flag State “to take the necessary measures to 
ensure that their nationals and vessels flying their flag are not engaged in 
IUU [illegal, unreported and unregulated] fishing activities.”55 After stating 
its agreement with that interpretation, the tribunal in the South China Sea 
arbitration continued, again stressing the importance of due regard: 
 
Given the importance of fisheries to the entire concept of the exclusive 
economic zone, the degree to which the Convention subordinates fishing 
within the exclusive economic zone to the control of the coastal State . . . 
the Tribunal considers that anything less than due diligence by a State in 
preventing its nationals from unlawfully fishing in the exclusive economic 
zone of another would fall short of the regard due pursuant to Article 58(3) 
of the Convention.56 
 
                                                                                                                      
51. Id., ¶ 78 (emphasis added). 
52. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/ 2016/07/PH-CN-
20160712-Award.pdf. 
53. See id., ¶¶ 744, 753, 757. 
54. Id., ¶ 744; see also Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional 
Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015, ¶ 124, 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/advisory_opin-
ion/C21_AdvOp_02 .04.pdf [hereinafter Fisheries Advisory Opinion]. 
55. Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Com-
mission (SRFC), supra note 54, ¶ 124. 
56. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 52, ¶ 744. 
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It is true that these cases pertained mainly to fisheries, and thus, are not 
directly relevant to intelligence gathering. However, it is possible to use these 
cases to draw some conclusions for how due regard should be construed 
towards intelligence gathering in the EEZ. First, it is certainly a matter of an 
ad hoc balancing exercise that should take into account a host of parameters, 
including “the nature of the rights held by the third State, their importance, 
the extent of the anticipated impairment, the nature and importance of the 
activities contemplated by the coastal State and the availability of alternative 
approaches.”57 
Second, it readily appears that this due regard obligation on the part of 
the coastal State is an “obligation of conduct,” not an “obligation of result.”58 
The coastal State has a “due diligence obligation”59 to have regard for the 
potential interference with the other States’ rights and to attempt to mitigate 
such interference. In some instances, consultations in good faith between 
the coastal State and the affected State may suffice, as it did in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction advisory opinion and the Chagos Marine Protected Area arbitration. 
A third, but more uncertain conclusion concerns the question of whether 
there is an absolute equilibrium between the rights of coastal States and the 
freedoms of other States. According to some commentators, “on a more 
careful reading, the imbalance between the position of the coastal State and 
that of the other States is clearly evident.”60 Regardless of whether such an 
imbalance is evident, one may argue that there is a rebuttable presumption 
in favor of the coastal State in respect of all uses that pertain to resources or, 
more broadly, have an economic value. Indeed, the Virginia Commentary 
suggests a shift of emphasis in favor of the coastal State even in situations 
covered by Article 59: “Given the functional nature of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, where economic interests are the principal concern this formula 
would normally favor the coastal State.”61 
                                                                                                                      
57. See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, supra note 44, ¶ 719. 
58. On this distinction, see Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 49, ¶ 129; see also Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct: Some Thoughts About the Implementation 
of International Obligations, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 363 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, 
Robert D. Sloane & Siegfried Wiessner eds., 2011). 
59. For a review of the due diligence obligation, see Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 
49, ¶¶ 130–73. 
60. See Leanza & Caracciolo, supra note 34, at 192. 
61. See 2 VIRGINIA COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at 569. 
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The presumption applies when a conflict between the rights of the 
coastal State and other States arise. Importantly, the other State receives pri-
ority over the coastal State only in exceptional circumstances, such as when 
the coastal State’s action constitutes an abuse of right. Still, as Proelss notes, 
this presumption is not “general and irrefutable,” but, a “rebuttable . . . pre-
sumption” whose “effects are directly assigned to the sphere of procedural 
law.”62 David Attard agrees, stating,  
 
with respect to activities related to the development of the zone’s re-
sources, the assumption is that the coastal State has the competence ‘equiv-
alent to that it enjoys in the territorial sea’, thereby shifting the onus of 
proof to the opponent. Thus, if another State’s activity clashes with this 
competence, and no priority is specified by the [Law of the Sea Conven-
tion], the onus of proof lies with the [other] State.63 
 
One could argue,64 however, that there is equally a rebuttable presump-
tion in favor of other States with respect to the use of the sea to safeguard 
the freedom of communications.65 A careful reading of the freedoms enjoyed 
by other States in the EEZ reveals that they all pertain to the jus communica-
tionis: freedoms of navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines and other associated uses.66 Indeed, as the Virginia Commentary 
acknowledges, “where conflicts arise on issues not involving the exploration 
                                                                                                                      
62. See Proelss, supra note 35, at 98–99 (noting that “it is generally recognized that in-
voking a rebuttable presumption established by rules of substantive law before a court shifts 
the burden of proof from one party of the dispute to the opposing party”). 
63. ATTARD, supra note 31, at 75. 
64. It is noteworthy that authors such as Proelss speak only about a rebuttable pre-
sumption in favor of the coastal State. In his words, “accepting that the shift of emphasis 
in favor of the coastal state is embodied in a rebuttable presumption gives consideration to 
the nature of the coastal state’s rights as constituting an extract of the comprehensive con-
cept of sovereignty . . . .” Proelss, supra note 35, at 99. 
65. As Proelss notes, the ICJ used the term “freedom of communications” in the Nic-
aragua case. Id. at 91 n.21; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 214, 253 (June 27). 
66. The jus communicationis, namely the right to communicate, and, a fortiori, the right to 
trade freely with other nations using high seas routes has been at the center of nearly all 
debates concerning the theoretical underpinnings of the freedom of the seas. See, e.g., 
Efthymios Papastavridis, The Right of Visit on the High Seas in a Theoretical Perspective: Mare 
Liberum versus Mare Clausum Revisited, 24 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45, 
62 (2011). 
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for and exploitation of resources, the formula would tend to favor the inter-
ests of other States or of the international community as a whole.”67 It is 
telling that in a recent dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, the arbitral tri-
bunal found that Slovenia’s enjoyment of the freedom of communication in 
the “Junction Area,” housed in the Croatian territorial sea encompassed the 
same freedoms as found in Article 58(1).68 
That said, it must be reiterated that the rights incorporated in Article 
58(1) do not reflect the rights within the regime of the high seas.69 This is 
evident from Article 58(2), which declares Articles 88 to 115 applicable in 
the EEZ only “in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.”70 
In sum, these two presumptions significantly assist in addressing those 
conflicts to which they apply, but they do not obviate the need for a careful 
assessment of each conflict on a case-by-case basis. For conflicts to which 
neither presumption applies, including many of those concerning intelli-
gence gathering, there should be recourse to Article 59, as well as to other 
applicable provisions within the Convention. Such provisions include the 
principle of good faith and the prohibition of the abuse of rights,71 the obli-
gation of all States to refrain from the use or the threat of use of force,72 the 
reservation of the EEZ for peaceful purposes,73 and other pertinent rules of 
international law.74 
Based on the discussion above, the following Part scrutinizes some of 
the intelligence gathering activities in which coastal States or other States are 
engaged, although an exhaustive treatment of all such activities is outside the 
scope of this article. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
67. 2 VIRGINIA COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at 569. 
68. Croatia v. Slovenia, Case No. 2012-04, Final Award, ¶ 1123 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2017), 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2172. 
69. See MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 65–
66 (2007). 
70. See also Tullio Treves, Military Installations, Structures, and Devices on the Seabed, 74 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 808, 843 (1980). 
71. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 300. 
72. Id., art. 301. 
73. Id., art. 58(2) (referencing art. 88, which states: “The high seas shall be reserved for 
peaceful purposes.”). 
74. Id. 
 
 
 
Intelligence Gathering in the EEZ Vol. 93 
461 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING BY COASTAL STATES 
 
The importance of intelligence gathering is evident in both law enforcement 
efforts and military operations, and recent developments to enhancing mar-
itime security is replete with mechanisms of information gathering and shar-
ing. Maritime domain awareness policies, the designation of maritime or aer-
ial identification zones and the use of satellite systems to track and monitor 
vessels share the same purpose—to increase awareness of the marine envi-
ronment and any activity therein that may amount to a threat to the security 
of the coastal State. This is especially true for coastal States operating in their 
EEZs given the economic considerations and contiguity with the territorial 
sea. As such, this Part examines unilateral and multilateral efforts to improve 
the collection of information in relation to the movement of ships. In par-
ticular, it focuses on maritime identification zones, such as the Australian 
Maritime Identification System, and various satellite-based tracking systems. 
 
A. Maritime Identification Zones 
 
As stated above, several States have promulgated maritime or aerial identifi-
cation zones to improve intelligence gathering concerning the movement of 
vessels or aircraft for maritime security purposes. Examples include the Air 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) of the United States established in 1950, the 
Japanese ADIZ promulgated in 1969 and of course, the East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone established by China in 2013.75 However, the 
most infamous and the identification zone that will serve as the focus of our 
analysis is the Australian Maritime Identification Zone (MIZ) promulgated 
on December 14, 2004 by Prime Minister John Howard, as part of Australia’s 
effort to strengthen its offshore maritime security.76 The MIZ, extending one 
thousand nautical miles from Australia’s coastline, was established to identify 
vessels, including their crew, cargo and journey, seeking to enter Australian 
ports. The provision of this information was viewed as a means of enhancing 
the effectiveness of civil and military maritime surveillance, particularly in 
protecting offshore oil and gas facilities in the Australian EEZ. In the MIZ, 
information would not only be sought from port-bound vessels entering this 
zone, but would also aim “to identify all vessels, other than day recreational 
                                                                                                                      
75. See Roncevert Almond, Clearing the Air above the East China Sea: The Primary Elements 
of Aircraft Defense Identification Zones, 7 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 126, 129, 
132, 191 (2016). 
76. See Klein, supra note 13, at 337–40. 
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boats” entering the EEZ.77 As initially envisaged, vessels not complying with 
the request to provide information would be subject to interdiction.78 
It was no surprise that Australia’s claim to such interdiction authority 
raised serious concerns as to the legality of the MIZ under international law.79 
Eventually, Australia reformulated the MIZ into the Australian Maritime 
Identification System (AMIS). Under the AMIS, ships would be requested 
to provide information on a voluntary basis and the new system would be 
based on cooperative international arrangements, particularly with neighbor-
ing States.80 It must be noted, however, that Australian maritime control in-
itiatives did not stop with AMIS, but revived in 2013 with Operation Sover-
eign Borders, which targets the influx of migrants by sea through various 
measures, including interdiction operations based, apparently at least in part, 
on intelligence.81 
As far as the legality of these measures in the EEZ is concerned, there is 
no reference in the Law of the Sea Convention to maritime identification 
zones. Under the Convention, coastal States may establish a contiguous zone 
extending up to twenty-four nautical miles from its baselines in which they 
may exercise the control of vessels necessary to prevent violations of certain 
laws and regulations.82 
In the EEZ, arguably, any identification process by the coastal State 
should be linked with the exercise of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                      
77. See Media Release, Prime Minister John Howard, Strengthening Offshore Maritime 
Security (Dec. 14, 2004), http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-21554; see also 
KLEIN, supra note 5, at 225. 
78. See Media Release, supra note 77. 
79. See Klein, in MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 8, at 227. 
80. See id.; see generally Cameron Moore, Turning King Canute into Lord Neptune: Australia’s 
New Offshore Protection Measures, 3 UNIVERSITY OF NEW ENGLAND LAW JOURNAL 57 (2006). 
81. The Australian government began Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) in Septem-
ber 2013. Under this policy, Australian officials prioritized preventing vessels carrying irreg-
ular migrants from reaching Australian territory. See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPART-
MENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION, OPERATION SOVEREIGN BORDERS, 
http://www.osb.border.gov.au/en/operation-sovereign-borders (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
See Natalie Klein, Assessing Australia’s Push Back the Boats Policy under International Law: Legality 
and Accountability for Maritime Interception Operations, 15 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 413 (2014). 
82. On the contiguous zone, see LOSC, supra note 1, art. 33; see also A.V. Lowe, The 
Development of the Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 52 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 109 (1981). 
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the conservation of living resources,83 the protection of offshore platforms84 
and the marine environment.85 Interestingly, in relation to the protection of 
the marine environment, Article 220(3) provides that 
 
[w]here there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the 
exclusive economic zone . . . has, in the exclusive economic zone, commit-
ted a violation of applicable international rules and standards for the pre-
vention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels or laws and regu-
lations of that State conforming and giving effect to such rules and stand-
ards, that State may require the vessel to give information regarding its identity and 
port of registry, its last and its next port of call and other relevant information required 
to establish whether a violation has occurred.86 
 
Thus, it specifies the information that may be requested, and in Article 
220(4), requires States to adopt laws and regulations and take other measures 
so vessels flying their flag comply with requests for this information. 
While this provision is limited in its application to conduct impacting the 
marine environment, any request of information that is linked with the exer-
cise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State over its natural 
resources in the EEZ would be consistent with the rebuttable presumption 
in favor of the coastal State discussed above, and would meet the due regard 
obligation set forth in Article 56(2). 
Moreover, in examining the legality of such intelligence activities in the 
EEZ, recourse may be had to other applicable rules of international law.87 
First, the coastal State, in this case Australia, is entitled to request infor-
mation from vessels seeking to enter its ports under customary international 
law and under the authority of the 2004 amendments to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)88 and the International 
                                                                                                                      
83. See, e.g., LOSC, supra note 1, art. 73. 
84. See, e.g., id. art. 60; see also Efthymios Papastavridis, Protecting Offshore Energy Installa-
tions under International Law of the Sea, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: 
EXPLORATION, ALLOCATION, EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN AREAS UNDER 
NATIONAL JURISDICTION AND BEYOND 197, 197 (Lawrence Martin, Constantinos Salonidis 
& Christina Hioureas eds., 2017). 
85. See LOSC, supra note 1, art. 60(1)(b)(iii). 
86. Id., art. 220(3) (emphasis added). 
87. Id., art. 58(2) (“Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply 
to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.”). 
88. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 
1184 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter SOLAS]. A 2004 amendment to SOLAS incorporated Chap-
ter XI-2 into the treaty. See Chapter XI-2: Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security, 
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Security and Port Security Code (ISPS Code).89 Second, information could 
also be requested for vessels in the EEZ under the customary “right of ap-
proach.” Since “other pertinent rules of international law” apply to the EEZ 
pursuant to Article 58(2), it is arguable that the customary right of all States 
to enquire about the identity of foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas 
equally applies thereto and may be exercised not only by Australian warships, 
but also by those of other States.  
Indeed, even though the international law of the sea does not permit 
interference with the navigation of foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas 
except in exceptional circumstances, the same does not hold true for other 
monitoring measures. For example, according to Oppenheim’s International 
Law, “it is a universally recognized customary rule of international law that 
warships of all nations, in order to maintain the safety of the high seas, have 
the power to require suspicious private vessels on the high seas to show their 
flag.”90 This right of approach, or reconnaissance, is limited to verifying the 
ship’s right to fly its flag.91 This, an approaching warship may request an 
encountered vessel to show its colors, which are prima facie evidence of its 
nationality.92 It is submitted here that the customary right of approach in 
principle, has remained intact in the twenty-first century, albeit its implemen-
tation has been significantly modified due to technological changes. As one 
commentator describes: 
 
in its exercise of the customary “right of approach,” a warship may inter-
cept a vessel, inspect it from a safe distance to determine its name, flag, and 
home port, receive and review any data the vessel may be emitting from its 
automatic identification system (AIS) or long range identification and 
                                                                                                                      
https://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/pdf/activities/statutory/isps/SOLAS-XI-2-e.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Chapter XI-2]. Chapter XI-2 introduced far-reaching measures to improve the security 
of ships and port facilities. For a discussion of IMO activities in furtherance of its mandate 
to make travel at sea as safe as possible, see Hartmut G. Hesse, Maritime Security in a Multi-
lateral Context: IMO Activities to Enhance Maritime Security, 18 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 327 (2003). 
89. The ISPS Code was incorporated in SOLAS by Chapter XI-2. See supra note 88. 
90. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 737 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 2008). 
91. The U.S. Supreme Court held: “In respect to ships of war . . . there is no reason 
why they may not approach any vessels descried at sea for the purpose of ascertaining their 
real characters. Such a right seems indispensable for the fair and discreet exercise of their 
authority . . . .” The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1826). 
92. See Yves van der Mensbrugghe, Le Pouvoir de Police des Etats en Haute Mer, 11 REVUE 
BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 56, 61 (1975). 
 
 
 
Intelligence Gathering in the EEZ Vol. 93 
465 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tracking (LRIT) equipment, perhaps scan other electromagnetic emissions 
if so equipped, and finally hail it on the radio.93 
 
It follows from the foregoing that the mere request of information by 
Australia or any other State establishing similar identification zones would 
not be in dissonance with international law. On the contrary, it may be 
founded on more than one legal basis. What would clearly be in dissonance 
is any interdiction operation based solely on the denial of the requested ves-
sel to provide the relevant information. As Natalie Klein rightly observes, 
“there is no exception to flag State authority on the high seas that would 
permit the right of visit to enforce a coastal State requirement to provide 
information in pursuit of that State’s maritime security policies.”94 The sole 
exception to this rule appears to be if the vessel has failed to provide infor-
mation concerning marine pollution in the EEZ, as found in Article 220(5).95 
Of course, if there are other suspicions regarding the vessel, for example, 
that it may be engaging in illegal fishing activities or that it is without nation-
ality, the coastal State may use other legal bases to intercept the vessel.96 
In sum, even though maritime identification zones are not provided for 
in the Law of the Sea Convention, the coastal State may request information 
from foreign vessels in its EEZ under certain circumstances and in relation 
to certain activities. Such information would be confined to the identity of 
the vessel, its next port of call and its activities that may be related to the 
suspicious conduct in question. Any further enforcement measures must be 
specifically warranted by the Convention, since the mere refusal to provide 
this information does not trigger these measures. 
                                                                                                                      
93. CRAIG H. ALLEN, MARITIME COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 82–83 (2007). 
94. Klein, in MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 8, at 226; see also Klein, supra note 13, at 
345–50, 352–57. 
95. Article 220(5) provides: 
Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed 
a violation referred to in paragraph 3 resulting in a substantial discharge causing or threat-
ening significant pollution of the marine environment, that State may undertake physical 
inspection of the vessel for matters relating to the violation if the vessel has refused to give infor-
mation or if the information supplied by the vessel is manifestly at variance with the evident 
factual situation and if the circumstances of the case justify such inspection. 
LOSC, supra note 1, art. 220(5) (emphasis added). 
96. Id., art. 73 (enforcing the laws and regulations of the coastal State) and id., art 
110(1)(d) (noting that a ship suspected of being without nationality provides a reasonable 
ground for boarding). 
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B. Earth Observation Systems 
 
It is an increasingly common practice of coastal States to employ earth ob-
servation systems, including satellites, radars or drones, to monitor vessels 
and their activities in an effort to prevent threats to maritime security. Such 
monitoring and surveillance measures are a key part of intelligence gathering 
in the EEZ. Examples include the automatic identification system (AIS) and 
the long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) system established by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the European Border Sur-
veillance System (EUROSUR) established by the European Union (EU). 
The IMO adopted AIS in 2000 as part of a revised Chapter V of SOLAS. 
It requires ships to carry an AIS capable of providing information about the 
vessel, such as identity, location, course and speed, to other vessels and 
coastal authorities. The regulation requires AIS to be fitted aboard all ships 
of three hundred gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voy-
ages, cargo ships of five hundred gross tonnage and upwards not engaged 
on international voyages and all passenger ships, irrespective of size.97 
The IMO further revised SOLAS to increase the tools available to States 
to learn about vessels in the surrounding waters by adopting Regulation 19-
1 in 2006. Regulation 19-1, which entered into force in July 2009, requires 
ships to transmit information automatically, through a satellite-based system, 
disclosing the identity of the ship, its position and the date and time of the 
                                                                                                                      
97. IMO Res. MSC.117(74), IMO Doc. MSC 74/24/Add.1, Adoption of Amendments 
to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended (June 6, 
2001), https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/marcomms/imo/msc_resolutions/MSC74-24a 
2.pdf. The requirement became effective for all ships on December 31, 2004. For more 
information, see AIS Transponders, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 
www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
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position.98 This information is to be received for “security and other pur-
poses as agreed” by the IMO,99 such as marine environment protection.100 
Similar to AIS, it applies to vessels engaged on international voyages and 
encompasses passenger ships, cargo ships of three hundred gross tonnage 
and upwards and mobile offshore drilling units.101 
In addition to AIS and the LRIT system, there are vessel monitoring 
systems (VMS) that have been developed and installed by some States and 
shipping companies. These systems are used in marine accident investiga-
tions, search and rescue, safety of navigation and pollution prevention.102 
The type of information collected may include the course of the vessel, its 
speed, draft, and estimated time of arrival and departure from various posi-
tions. The use of VMS has also become an important means of deriving 
information about the location of fishing vessels, to which LRIT regulations 
do not usually apply because of their smaller size. Accordingly, many regional 
fisheries management organisations have introduced VMS as a means of en-
hancing surveillance and enforcement.103 
In 2013, the European Council adopted a regulation establishing EU-
ROSUR.104 Its aim is to reinforce control of the external borders of the EU 
States. In particular, EUROSUR establishes a mechanism for member States’ 
                                                                                                                      
98. IMO Res. MSC.202(81), IMO Doc. MSC 81/25/Add.1, Adoption of Amendments 
to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended (May 19, 
2006), http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/Maritime-
Safety-Committee-(MSC)/Documents/MSC.202(81).pdf [hereinafter 2006 Amendment to 
SOLAS]. For further information on the LRIT system, see Long-Range Identification and Track-
ing (LRIT), INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.org/en/Our-
Work/Safety/Navigation/Pages/LRIT.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
99. 2006 Amendment to SOLAS, supra note 98, ¶ 8.1. 
100. See IMO Res. MSC.242(83), IMO Doc. MSC 83/28/Add 2, Annex 6, Use of the 
Long-Range Identification and Tracking Information for Maritime Safety and Marine En-
vironment Protection Purposes (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.crs.hr/Portals/0/docs/eng/ 
imo_iacs_eu/imo/msc_reports/MSC_83_28-Add-2.pdf?ver=2010-11-03-135332-000. 
101. See 2006 Amendment to SOLAS, supra note 98, Reg. 19-1, ¶ 2.1. 
102. See Klein, in MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 8, at 227–28. 
103. See, e.g., “Volga” Case (Russ. v Austl.), Case No 11, Judgment of Dec. 23, 2002, 
2002 ITLOS Rep. 10, 28, 34 https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/ 
case_no_11/11_judgment_231202_en.pdf; see also ROSEMARY GAIL RAYFUSE, NON-FLAG 
STATE ENFORCEMENT IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 269 (2004). 
104. Regulation 1052/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Oc-
tober 2013 Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 2013 O.J. (L 
295/11). For additional information, see Press Release, Council of the European Union, 
Council Adopts Regulation Establishing the EUROSUR System (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/139099.pdf. 
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authorities carrying out border surveillance activities to share operational in-
formation and to cooperate with each other and with other EU agencies, 
such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (formerly known as 
FRONTEX). Its objectives are reduction of the number of irregular mi-
grants entering the EU undetected and enhanced internal security by pre-
venting cross-border crime, such as trafficking in human beings and narcot-
ics smuggling. Clearly, the surveillance of maritime borders is facilitated by 
the use of modern technologies such as satellites. 
These developments were echoed in some very interesting findings made 
by the arbitral tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise award in 2015.105 In discussing 
whether the Russian authorities fulfilled the requirement of sending “a visual 
or auditory signal to stop” to the Greenpeace vessel, Arctic Sunrise, as dictated 
by the right of hot pursuit under Article 111, the tribunal stated, 
 
Given the large areas that now must be policed by coastal States and the 
availability of more reliable advanced technology (sea-bed sensors, satellite 
surveillance, over-the-horizon radar, unmanned aerial vehicles), it would 
not make sense to limit valid orders to stop to those given by an enforce-
ment craft within the proximity required for an audio or visual signal that 
makes no use of radio communication.106 
 
Such an evolutionary interpretation of the Convention’s hot pursuit pro-
visions is certainly welcome, as it takes into account contemporary techno-
logical advancements and the practice of States. However, no broader con-
clusions can be drawn from this finding. The tribunal alluded to satellites, 
along with other devices, such as radars and UAVs, solely to substantiate its 
argument that in the twenty-first century, law enforcement agencies may also 
lawfully use radio communication in lieu of “a visual or auditory signal” un-
der Article 111. Can this argument also be interpreted as allowing the coastal 
State to use these specific means to give signals to stop? Possibly yes, in the 
view of the author, if there are secure channels of communication providing 
safeguards to ensure the signal comes from competent authorities of the 
coastal State and that the vessel is aware of the existence of these channels. 
The question in the context of our inquiry, however, is broader than the 
use of such systems in the course of hot pursuit and concerns the legality of 
                                                                                                                      
105. The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 2014-02, Award on the 
Merits (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1438. For a 
discussion of this award, see James Harrison, The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. 
Russia), 31 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 145 (2016). 
106. The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, ¶ 260. 
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such methods for intelligence gathering in the EEZ. Evidently, to the extent 
that these measures are incorporated in treaties like SOLAS, there is no 
doubt that they are part of the “pertinent rules of international law” that 
apply to the EEZ under Article 58(2). But even besides the authority pro-
vided by SOLAS, it stands to reason that the use of earth observation sys-
tems, including radars, satellites and drones, by the coastal State in its EEZ 
would comply with the international law of the sea, either pursuant to Arti-
cles 56 and 59 or under the customary right of approach. 
Specifically, as long as coastal States police their EEZ to safeguard their 
exercise of sovereign rights therein or to protect the marine environment, 
these acts would clearly accord with the rebuttable presumption in favor of 
the coastal State. Even if we have recourse to the abstract formula of Article 
59, it is submitted that “equity” and the “importance of the interests involved 
to the parties” would considerably favor the coastal State. 
On the other hand, as permitted under the customary right of approach, 
every State, including the coastal State, may request some basic information 
regarding the vessels exercising the freedom of navigation. States can do this 
by sending their warships and other duly authorized vessels to approach the 
vessel concerned or through observation systems, like AIS and vessel mon-
itoring systems (VMS).107 As stated above, the intention of the right of ap-
proach has traditionally been to inquire the identity of vessels on the high 
seas. In modern times, there is no need to approach the vessel physically to 
complete this act, as States can achieve the same result by using earth obser-
vation systems. The rationale, however, remains the same.  
That said, it is one thing to request information on the flag, the name or 
the course of the vessel concerned and another to interfere with its naviga-
tion, board and search it. For the latter actions, there must be another legal 
basis found in the provisions of the Convention concerning the EEZ or the 
high seas by reference to Article 58(2), as well as the default rule of the con-
sent of the flag State. 
A further, extremely relevant question concerns the level of information 
that coastal States may request in the exercise of the right of approach, either 
in its traditional form or in its contemporary manifestations. Certainly, earth 
observation systems have limits on what they can actually see and discern. 
Nonetheless, it is the present author’s view that the intelligence that may be 
collected or requested is confined to that information needed for the “police 
                                                                                                                      
107. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 93, at 82–83. 
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générale” of the EEZ. This data may include the vessel’s nationality and doc-
umentation number, its current position and its course, as well as the next 
port of call, especially if they are fishing vessels and are bound to a port of 
the coastal State.108 However, any further information concerning the inter-
nal matters of the vessel, including information relating to its crew and cargo, 
falls within the remit of flag-State jurisdiction and may not be requested 
solely under the right of approach.109 Such a request would undermine the 
freedom of navigation safeguarded in Article 58, as well as shift the presump-
tion from favoring the coastal State to favoring other States and their jus 
communicationis, as discussed in Part III.110 
To conclude, the use of earth observation systems, with their advantages 
and inherent limitations, will increase and will inevitably challenge the tradi-
tional contours of policing of the seas, including the EEZ. It rests upon State 
practice and future judicial opinions to discern how to accommodate such 
advancements with the legal regime of the EEZ and the freedom of naviga-
tion of other States. 
 
V. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING BY OTHER STATES IN THE EEZ 
 
It is a truism that most scholarly writings have been devoted not to whether 
the coastal State may engage in intelligence gathering in the EEZ, but the 
inverse question: whether other States may engage in intelligence gathering 
in a foreign EEZ. Several recent incidents in various EEZs,111 political ten-
sion in contested areas such as Southeast Asia and the importance that naval 
powers ascribe to military intelligence gathering112 have all fueled this debate. 
                                                                                                                      
108. Under EU legislation, “third country fishing vessels . . . shall notify the competent 
authorities of the Member State whose designated port or landing facilities they wish to use 
at least three working days before the estimated time of arrival at the port” and provide 
certain required information, including the fishing authorization, dates of the trip and the 
quantities of each species retained on board. See Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008, of 29 
September 2008 Establishing a Community System to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 286/1). 
109. For vessels bound to coastal State ports, additional information may be requested 
(and required) pursuant to the ISPS Code and other regulations under SOLAS. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 64–74. 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23. 
112. Valencia has described why this issue remains problematic: 
Military and intelligence gathering activities by foreign nations in or over others EEZs are 
becoming more frequent due to the accelerating pace of globalization; the tremendous in-
crease in world trade; the rise in the size and quality of the navies of many nations; and 
technological advances that allow navies to better utilize oceanic areas. 
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In particular, questions arise as to the contours of the rights of coastal States 
and the freedom of navigation enjoyed by other States. As Natalie Klein ob-
serves, “the lack of legal clarity has become especially problematic as tech-
nological advances have not only improved the range and accuracy of both 
weaponry and intelligence collection, but also changed the very art of both 
warfare and intelligence gathering.”113 In this regard, Hayashi describes po-
tential intelligence activities as follows: 
 
Other [signals intelligence] activities intercept naval radar and emitters, thus 
enabling the location, identification and tracking of surface ships as well as 
the planning and preparation of electronic or missile attacks against them. 
These activities appear to involve far greater interference with the commu-
nication and defense systems of the targeted coastal State than any tradi-
tional passive intelligence gathering activities conducted from outside na-
tional territory.114 
 
The law of the sea does not provide a straightforward answer concerning 
the permissibility of intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ. While Arti-
cle 19(2)(c) defines intelligence gathering in the territorial sea as non-inno-
cent passage, there is no corresponding provision in the Convention that 
addresses intelligence gathering in the EEZ.115 Hence, a contrario, one can 
presume that since this activity is not prohibited, it is permitted.116 Indeed, 
the preponderant view is that intelligence gathering is one of the “other in-
ternationally lawful uses of the sea” related to the freedoms set forth in Ar-
ticle 58.117 For example, Hayashi notes, “[t]raditionally, intelligence gathering 
                                                                                                                      
Valencia, supra note 2, at 98. 
113. Klein, in MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 8, at 215. 
114. See Hayashi, supra note 2, at 126; see also Valencia, supra note 2, at 98. 
115. Those involved in the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Convention maintain 
that the general understanding was that such activities could be conducted, even though 
some States argued against such a position at the time. See Klein, in MARITIME SECURITY, 
supra note 8, at 219. 
116. This would be consistent with the old, yet in some respects persistent, Lotus prin-
ciple. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). 
For a more contemporary version of this principle, see Accordance with International Law 
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 
2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 79 (July 22). See also the very poignant critique of Judge Simma in 
his Declaration, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 478, ¶ 8 (July 22) (dec-
laration by Simma, J.). 
117. For a contrary view, see, for example, Xiaofeng & Xizhong, supra note 4; see also 
Haiwen, supra note 4. 
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activities have been regarded as part of the exercise of freedom of the high 
seas and therefore, through Article 58(1), [is] lawful in the EEZ as well.”118 
Similarly, Rauch has argued that the freedom of navigation associated with 
the “operation of ships” allows for a range of internationally lawful military 
activities, including intelligence gathering and surveillance.119 
Assuming that intelligence gathering is associated with the freedom of 
navigation enjoyed by other States in foreign EEZs, the rebuttable presump-
tion would favor its permissibility. However, as discussed in the previous 
Part, this is just a rebuttable presumption, which is subject to the legal regime 
of the EEZ, the Convention, and other pertinent rules of international law. 
In turn, this point raises the question of when the presumption may be re-
butted or qualified. 
It is obvious that the gathering and sharing of intelligence would be un-
lawful if it interfered with the exercise of the coastal State’s sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction. This outcome would be evident where information gather-
ing undermined the existing sovereign rights of coastal States. More broadly, 
it could be argued that any intelligence gathering, having as its purpose the 
economic benefit of other States would violate the due regard requirement 
in Article 58(3), at least as that requirement has been construed in the Chagos 
Marine Protected Area and the South China Sea arbitrations. 
An example of such intelligence gathering would be the incidental—and 
perhaps intentional—collection of information related to the natural re-
sources of the EEZ, such as a survey involving the acquisition of seismic 
data that could be used to locate oil and gas exploratory wells. Such an ac-
quisition could occur in the course of a marine scientific research project 
that had already received the requisite consent by the coastal State under 
Article 246(2).120 Here, the collection of such information would amount to 
an unjustifiable interference with the sovereign rights of the coastal State 
under Article 77, as preserved under Article 246(7),121 as well as under Article 
56 in conjunction with Article 58(3). 
                                                                                                                      
118. See Hayashi, supra note 2, at 130. 
119. See Elmar Rauch, Military Uses of the Oceans, 28 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 229, 252 (1985); see also Walter F. Doran, An Operational Commander’s Perspective 
on the 1982 LOS Convention, 10 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 
335 (1995). 
120. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 246(2) (“Marine scientific research in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and on the continental shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal 
State.”). 
121. Id., art. 246(7) (“The provisions of paragraph 6 are without prejudice to the rights 
of coastal States over the continental shelf as established in article 77.”). 
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A second example in which military intelligence gathering by third States 
in the EEZ would not be permitted is when such activities constituted un-
lawful conduct122 as “the threat or use of force” contrary to Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter,123 and, more particularly, to Article 301 of the Law of the 
Sea Convention. As Article 301 states: 
 
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Conven-
tion, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations.124 
 
This provision echoes, but is not identical to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
Nonetheless, Article 2(4) may serve as the interpretative yardstick for inci-
dents falling within the scope of Article 301. 
It is true that international courts and tribunals have been very reluctant 
to find a “threat or use of force.” An arbitration tribunal did make such a 
finding in a 2007 award arising from a dispute between Guyana and Suri-
name. Here, sailors on two Surinamese gunboats asked the operators of a 
Guyanese-licensed drilling rig in a contested maritime area to leave the rig 
within twelve hours.125 The tribunal concluded these activities amounted to 
an illegal threat of the use of force, rather than a law enforcement activity.126 
In general, to constitute a threat of the use of force, the act in question 
must involve a considerable degree of coercion against the coastal State. 
Thus, the act of intelligence gathering, without any further activities, would 
fall short of reaching the threshold of either Article 301 or Article 2(4). The 
act would need to be accompanied by other coercive measures to substanti-
ate impermissible intelligence gathering. As an example, Bateman suggests 
                                                                                                                      
122. In the EEZ, Article 58(1) permits other States the freedoms “of navigation and 
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful 
uses of the sea related to these freedoms . . . .”). Id., art. 58(1). 
123. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
124. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 301. 
125. Guyana v. Suriname, Case No. 2014-2, Award, ¶ 445 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/902. For a discussion of this case, see Patricia 
Jimenez Kwast, Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of 
Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award, 13 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT 
AND SECURITY LAW 49 (2008). 
126. Guyana v. Suriname, ¶ 445. 
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that “[t]ypically this would be the case if the research or data collection were 
being undertaken to support contingency plans for military operations 
against the coastal State.”127 In the author’s view, such data collection would 
not amount to a threat of the use of force, unless it is accompanied by other 
coercive measures and explicit threats of aggressive action by the State con-
cerned. As such, it is evident that the threshold for establishing such a viola-
tion is particularly high. 
Another instance in which intelligence gathering by other States within 
the EEZ would violate the law of the sea is when that State’s activities 
amount to an abuse of right, in this case the right of navigation and the as-
sociated right to collect information in a foreign EEZ Article 300 of the 
Convention addresses good faith and abuse of right, stating: “States Parties 
shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and 
shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Con-
vention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.”128 Ac-
cording to the Virginia Commentary, “it would appear that the parameters 
of the notion as enunciated in Article  300—and applicable to the whole 
Convention— . . . concern the unnecessary or arbitrary exercise of rights, 
jurisdiction and freedoms or the misuse of powers by such a State Party.”129 
Having assumed that intelligence gathering is a freedom reserved under Ar-
ticle 58(1), it may still result in abusive conduct, such as when it is conducted 
arbitrarily or unaligned with a purpose associated with the jus communicationis. 
That said, abuse of right has proven a very elusive concept, scarcely referred 
to in international case law,130 and very difficult to substantiate in practice. 
                                                                                                                      
127. Bateman, supra note 24, at 172. 
128. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 300. Further, The Virginia Commentary describes an 
abuse of rights as 
[t]he exercise by a State of a right in such a manner or in such circumstances as indicated 
that it was for that State an indirect means of avoiding an international obligation imposed 
upon that State, or was carried out with a purpose not corresponding to the purpose for 
which that right was recognized in favor of that State. 
5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 152 
(Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne & Louis B. Sohn eds., 1989) (citing JULES BASDE-
VANT, DICTIONNAIRE DE LA TERMINOLOGIE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1960)) [herein-
after 5 VIRGINIA COMMENTARY]. 
129. 5 VIRGINIA COMMENTARY, supra note 128, at 152. 
130. The Permanent Court of International Justice considered the abuse of rights in 
several cases. See, e.g., Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Judg-
ment, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 30 (May 25); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the 
District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), Judgment, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 167 (June 7). 
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In sum, notwithstanding that some scholars disagree,131 intelligence gath-
ering in foreign EEZs is a lawful use of the seas associated with the freedoms 
reserved for other States in coastal State EEZs. While this presumption is 
rebuttable, few examples arise that do not favor this presumption, and for 
those that do, it is often the underlying conduct, rather than the intelligence 
gathering itself that violates the law of the sea and international law generally. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has explored the contours of intelligence gathering in the EEZ 
under the international law of the sea. Intelligence gathering in the maritime 
domain is significant for military and law enforcement purposes and for both 
coastal States and other States. Intelligence gathering attains even more 
prominence in the EEZ due to the sensitive location and importance of re-
sources to the coastal State. Crucially, the law of the sea, as reflected in the 
Law of the Sea Convention, neither explicitly prohibits nor permits the col-
lection of information by other States in the EEZ. Equally, it is silent on the 
extent of the intelligence gathering on the part of the coastal State. 
While acknowledging the complexity of legal issues pertaining to the 
EEZ, this article concludes that intelligence gathering within the EEZ would 
fall under a presumption of unlawfulness favoring the coastal State when the 
intelligence pertains to its economic interests. In contrast, the presumption 
would favor other States, rather than the coastal State, when the gathering 
of intelligence is a sheer expression of the jus communicationis of the other 
State. Moreover, the pertinent rules of international law, ranging from the 
prohibition of the threat of the use of force and the abuse of right to the 
customary right of approach may find application when deciding whether 
the intelligence gathering activity violated the rights of the coastal State or 
other States. As demonstrated above, determining the lawfulness of intelli-
gence gathering in the EEZ is certainly not easy nor straightforward legal 
question. Nonetheless, it is a question that the international law of the sea 
can answer. 
 
                                                                                                                      
131. See, e.g., Xiaofeng & Xizhong, supra note 4; see also Haiwen, supra note 4. 
